


























































of Micro Asset Market Segmentation 
Chris Edmond† Pierre-Olivier Weill‡
First draft: March 2009. This draft: January 2011
Abstract
This paper develops a consumption-based asset pricing modelt oe x p l a i na n d
quantify the aggregate implications of a frictional ﬁnancial system, comprised of
many ﬁnancial markets partially integrated with one another. Each of our micro
ﬁnancial markets is inhabited by traders who are specializedi nt h a tm a r k e t ’ s
type of asset. We specify exogenously the level of segmentation that ultimately
determines how much idiosyncratic risk traders bear in theirm i c r om a r k e ta n d
derive aggregate asset pricing implications. We pick segmentation parameters to
match facts about systematic and idiosyncratic return volatility. We ﬁnd that
if the same level of segmentation prevails in every market, traders bear 30% of
their idiosyncratic risk. With otherwise standard parameters, this benchmark
model delivers an unconditional equity premium of 2.4% annual. We further
disaggregate the model by allowing the level of segmentation to di er across
markets. This version of the model delivers the same aggregate asset pricing
implications but with only one-third the amount of segmentation: on average
traders bear 10% of their idiosyncratic risk.
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‡UCLA and NBER.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Asset trade occurs in a wide range of security markets and is inhibited by a diverse ar-
ray of frictions. Upfront transaction costs, asymmetric information between ﬁnal asset
holders and ﬁnancial intermediaries, and trade in over-the-counter or other decentral-
ized markets that make locating counterparties di cult, all create “limits to arbitrage”
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). A considerable empirical and theoretical literature on mar-
ket microstructure has studied these frictions and conclusively ﬁnds that “local” factors,
speciﬁc to the market under consideration, matter for asset prices in that market (see
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001; Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron,
2007, for example). But these market-speciﬁc analyses do not give a clear sense of
whether micro frictions and local factors matter in the aggregate. Indeed, by focusing
exclusively on market-speciﬁc determinants of asset prices, these analyses are some-
what disconnected from traditional frictionless consumption-based asset pricing models
of Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979)a n dMehra and Prescott (1985). Research in that tra-
dition takes the opposite view, that micro asset market frictions and local factors do not
matter in the aggregate and that asset prices are determined by broad macroeconomic
factors. The truth presumably lies somewhere between these two extremes: asset prices
reﬂect both macro and micro-market speciﬁc factors (Cochrane, 2005).
This paper constructs a simple consumption-based asset pricing model in order
to explain and quantify the macro impacts of micro market-speciﬁc factors. At the
heart of our paper is a stylized model of a ﬁnancial system comprised of a collection
of many small micro ﬁnancial markets that are partially integrated with one another.
We strip this model of a fragmented ﬁnancial system down to a few essential features
and borrow some modeling tricks from Lucas (1990) and others to build a tractable
aggregate model. In short, we take a deliberately macro approach:w ed on o ta d d r e s s
any particular features of any speciﬁc asset class but we are able to spell out precisely
the aggregate implications of fragmentation and limits-to-arbitrage frictions.
In our benchmark model, there are many micro asset markets. Each market is
inhabited by traders specialized in trading a single type of durable risky asset with
supply normalized to one. Of course, if the risky assets could be frictionlessly traded
across markets all idiosyncratic market-speciﬁc risk would be diversiﬁed away and each
asset trader would be exposed only to aggregate risk. We prevent this full risk sharing
by imposing, exogenously, the following pattern of market-speciﬁc frictions: we assume
that for each market m an exogenous fraction,  m, of the expense of purchasing assets
in that market must be borne by traders specialized in that market. In return, these
traders receive  m of the beneﬁt, i.e., of the dividends and resale price of assets sold in
1that market. We show that, in equilibrium, the parameter  m measures the amount of
non-tradeable idiosyncratic risk. When  m = 0 all idiosyncratic risk can be traded and
traders are fully diversiﬁed. When  m = 1 traders cannot trade away their idiosyncratic
risk and simply consume the dividends thrown o  by the asset in their speciﬁc market.
Our theoretical market setup is made tractable by following Lucas (1990) in assum-
ing that investors can pool the tradeable idiosyncratic risk within a large family. In
equilibrium, the “state price” of a unit of consumption in each market m is a weighted
average of the marginal utility of consumption in that market (with weight  m)a n d
a term that reﬂects the cross-sectional average marginal utility of consumption (with
weight 1    m). Generally, both the average level of  m and its cross-sectional varia-
tion across markets play crucial roles in determining the equilibrium mapping from the
state of the economy, as represented by the realized exogenous distribution of dividends
across markets, to the endogenous distribution of asset prices across markets. In the
special case where  m = 0 for all markets m, the state price of consumption is equal
across markets and equal to the marginal utility of the aggregate endowment so that
this economy collapses to the standard Lucas (1978) consumption-based asset pricing
model. The speciﬁcation of  m, representing the array of micro frictions which impede
trade in claims to assets across markets, constitutes our one new degree of freedom
relative to a standard consumption-based asset pricing model.
We start by calibrating a special case of the general model where  m =   for all
markets. We choose standard parameters for aggregates and preferences: independently
and identically distributed lognormal aggregate endowment growth, time- and state-
separable expected utility preferences with constant relative risk aversion   =4 . W e
then use the parameters governing the distribution of individual endowments and the
single   to simultaneously match the systematic return volatility of a well-diversiﬁed
market portfolio and key time-series properties of an individual stock’s total return
volatility (see Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003; Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang, 2005). This
procedure yields segmentation of approximately   =0 .30. We ﬁnd that this model
generates a sizeable unconditional equity premium, some 2.4% annual. However, as is
familiar from many asset pricing models with expected utility preferences and trend
growth, the model has a risk-free rate that is too high and too volatile.
Next, we extend this benchmark model by allowing for multiple types ofm a r k e t s ,
each with di erent amounts of segmentation,  m, which generates cross-sectional dif-
ferences in stock return volatilities. We pick values for  m in order to match the
volatilities of portfolios sorted on measures of idiosyncratic volatility,a sd o c u m e n t e d
by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Our main ﬁnding is that aggregation does
2matter: with cross-sectional variation in  m,w en e e da naverage amount of segmenta-
tion of approximately ¯   =0 .10 to hit our targets, only one-third that of the single  
model. Moreover, this version of the model delivers essentially the same aggregate as-
set pricing implications as the single   benchmark despite having only about one-third
the average amount of segmentation. The characteristics of the micro markets in this
disaggregate economy are quite distinct: some 50% of the aggregate market by value
has a  m of approximately zero, with the amount of segmentation rising to a maximum
of  m =0 .37 for about 2% of the aggregate market by value.
Market frictions in the asset pricing literature. Traditionally, macroeconomists
have taken the view that frictions in ﬁnancial intermediation or othera s s e tt r a d e sa r e
small enough to be neglected in the analysis: asset prices are set “as if” there were no
intermediaries but instead a grand Walrasian auction directly betweenc o n s u m e r s .I n
particular, early contributions to the literature, such as Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978)
and Breeden (1979), characterize equilibrium asset prices using frictionless models. The
quantitative limitations of plausibly calibrated traditional asset pricing models were
highlighted by the “equity premium” and “risk-free rate” puzzles of Mehra and Prescott
(1985), Weil (1989)a n do t h e r s .
Since then an extensive literature has attempted to explicitly incorporate market
frictions into an asset pricing model in an attempt to rationalize these and related asset
pricing puzzles.1 These models have tended to follow one of two approaches. On the one
hand, part of the ﬁnancial economics literature followed deliberately micro-market ap-
proaches, focusing on the impact of speciﬁc frictions in speciﬁc ﬁnancial markets. This
microfoundations approach is transparent and leads to precise implications but does
not lead to any clear sense of whether or why micro asset market frictions matter in the
aggregate. Moreover, these models are typically not well integrated with the standard
Lucas (1978) consumption-based asset pricing framework. On the other hand are un-
abashedly aggregate approaches, with some ﬁnancial friction faced by either some rep-
resentative intermediary (see, e.g., Aiyagari and Gertler, 1999; Kyle and Xiong, 2001;
Vayanos, 2005; He and Krishnamurthy, 2008a,b) or by households (see, among many
others Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Chien, Cole, and Lustig, 2011; Pavlova and Rigobon,
2008). The friction “stands in” for a diverse array of real-world micro frictions on the
intermediary’s and households’ side. Since there are large discrepancies between the
1See for example Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), He and Modest (1995)a n dLuttmer (1996, 1999)f o r
the quantitative evaluation of asset pricing models with trading frictions. Other attempts to rationalize
asset pricing puzzles retain frictionless markets but depart from traditional models by using novel
preference speciﬁcations (e.g., Epstein and Zin (1989), Weil (1989, 1990), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)) and/or novel shock processes (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004)).
3predictions of frictionless asset pricing models and the data, the calibrated friction also
tends to have to be large. This approach has the advantage that the friction has macro
implications, by construction, but has the disadvantage that the friction has no trans-
parent interpretation. In particular, it is di cult to evaluate the plausibility of the
calibrated friction in terms of the constraints facing real-world households and ﬁrms.
In these macro models, ﬁnancial intermediaries often bear disproportionate amounts
of aggregate risk, but this implication is inconsistent with the empirical literature on
market segmentation, which emphasizes instead that intermediaries bear dispropor-
tionate amounts of “local” or idiosyncratic risk. Our approach takes a middle course.
Starting from a model that is consistent with intermediaries bearing too much local
risk, we work out the aggregation problem. With the aggregation problem solved, we
can then embed our stylized model of a collection of micro markets that together form a
ﬁnancial system into an otherwise standard asset pricing model and examine its quanti-
tative implications. In a sense, our model can be viewed as a multiple market version of
a limited participation model of asset prices where agents are restricted in their ability
to participate in asset trade. Important early contributions to this approach include
Makoto (1995), Basak and Cuoco (1998), and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). State of the
art contributions to this literature include Gomes and Michaelides (2008), Guvenen
(2009)a n dChien, Cole, and Lustig (2011).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our
model and show how to compute equilibrium asset prices. In Section 3 we calibrate a
special case of the model with a single type of market segmentation and in Section 4
we show that this model can generate a sizeable equity premium. Section 5 extends
this benchmark model by allowing for multiple types of market segmentation and a
non-degenerate cross-section of volatilities. Technical details and several extensions are
given in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
The model is a variant on the pure endowment asset pricing models of Lucas (1978),
Breeden (1979)a n dMehra and Prescott (1985).
2.1 Setup
Market structure and endowments. Time is discrete and denoted t  { 0,1,2,...}.
A probability space ( ,F,P) is ﬁxed as well as an information ﬁltration {Ft} 
t=0.T h e r e
4are many distinct micro asset markets indexed by m   [0,1]. Each market m is special-
ized in trading a single type of durable asset with supply normalized to Sm =1 .E a c h
period the asset produces a stochastic realization of a non-storable dividend ym,t > 0.








The aggregate endowment yt > 0 follows an exogenous stochastic process that we
describe in detail later. Conditional on all realized aggregate variables, the endowments
ym,t are independently and identically distributed (IID) across markets.
Preferences. We follow Lucas (1990) and use a representative family construct to
provide consumption insurance beyond our market-segmentation frictions. The single
representative family, which is initially endowed with the entire supply of assets, consists
of many, identical, traders who are specialized in particular asset markets. The period





where u : R+   R is a standard increasing concave utility function. Only in the
special case of risk neutrality does the family view the consumption of each type of
trader as being perfect substitutes. In general, concavity will lead the family to smooth
consumption across traders in di erent markets. Intertemporal utility for the family
has the standard time- and state-separable form, E0 [
  
t=0  tU(ct)], with constant time
discount factor 0 < <1. The crucial role of the representative family is to eliminate
the wealth distribution across markets as an additional endogenous state variable (see,
e.g., Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe, 2002).
Segmentation frictions. We interpret the representative family as a partially inte-
grated ﬁnancial system. Each trader in market m works at a specialized trading desk
that deals in the asset speciﬁc to that market (Figure 1 illustrates). Traders in market
m are assumed to bear an exogenous fraction  m   [0,1] of the expense of trading
in that market and in return receive  m of the beneﬁt. The remaining 1    m of the
expense and beneﬁt of trading in that market is shared between family members.
More precisely, given segmentation parameter  m, the period budget constraint
5facing a representative trader in market m is:
cm,t +  mpm,tsm,t+1 +( 1   m)Tt+1    m(pm,t + ym,t)sm,t +( 1   m)Tt, (1)
where pm,t is the ex-dividend price of a share in asset m while sm,t and sm,t+1 represent
share holdings in that asset, and where Tt and Tt+1 represent, respectively, the cum-
dividend value of a family portfolio that is brought into the period and the the ex-
dividend value of the family portfolio acquired this period.
To understand the family portfolio, observe from the budget constraint (1)t h a t
a trader in market m holds directly a number  msm,t+1 of shares of asset m.T h e
collection of remaining shares, (1    n)sn,t+1 for all n   [0,1], is collectively held by
all family members in the family portfolio. The expense and beneﬁt of trading the
family portfolio is divided among family members in a manner summarized byt h et w o
terms (1    m)Tt+1 and (1    m)Tt in the budget constraint, (1). Speciﬁcally, the
term (1  m)Tt+1 on the left-hand side means that the trader in market m is asked to
contribute 1    m of the expense of acquiring the family portfolio. Symmetrically, the
term (1    m)Tt on the right-hand side means that the trader receives 1    m of the
beneﬁt. Thus, a balanced family budget requires that:
  1
0
(1    m)Tt+1 dm =
  1
0
(1    n)pn,tsn,t+1 dm.
In words, the total value of all family members’ contributions to the family portfolio (the
left-hand side) has to equal the total asset value of the family portfolio (the right-hand
side). Deﬁning ¯   :=
  1




1    n




0 (1    m)Tt dm is equal to the cum-dividend value of the remaining shares




1    n
1   ¯  
(pn,t + yn,t)sn,t dn. (3)
2.2 Equilibrium asset pricing
A price path is an adapted sequence p = {pt} 
t=0,w h e r ept : [0,1]   R+ is a measurable
function mapping each asset m   [0,1] into its price, pm,t, at time t. Given a price path,
6family portfolio
traders at each market m
family contributes
fraction 1    m
to all local trades
traders contribute
fraction  m to their local trade
Figure 1: Market structure and segmentation frictions.
There are many markets m   [0,1]. Traders at each market bear fraction  m of the expense of their trades and share
the remaining fraction 1    m of the expense with all other traders through a family portfolio.
the family maximizes its intertemporal utility by choosing an adapted consumption and
asset holding plan, (c,s )={ct,s t+1} 
t=0,w h e r ect : [0,1]   R+ and st+1 : [0,1]   R
are measurable functions specifying cm,t and sm,t+1 in each asset market m   [0,1].
The maximization is subject to the collection of budget constraints (1), one for each
m   [0,1], the accounting identities for the family portfolio, (2)a n d( 3), and the initial
asset holding condition sm,0 = 1 for all m   [0,1].
An equilibrium of this economy is a consumption and asset holding plan, (c,s ), and
a price path, p, such that (i) (c,s ) solves the family’s problem given p, and (ii) asset
markets clear, i.e., sm,t+1 = 1 for all m   [0,1] and t  { 0,1,2,... }.
Equilibrium allocation. Before solving for asset prices, we provide the equilibrium
allocation of consumption across markets. Substituting the accounting identities (2)a n d
(3) into the budget constraint (1) and imposing the equilibrium condition sm,t+1 =1 ,
we obtain:
cm,t =  mym,t +( 1   m)
  1
0
1    n
1   ¯  
yn,tdn.
7Since the realized idiosyncratic endowments yn,t are independent of  n, an application
of the law of large numbers gives:
cm,t =  mym,t +( 1   m)yt. (4)
This formula is intuitive: equilibrium consumption in market m is a weighted average
of the idiosyncratic and aggregate endowments with weights reﬂecting the degree of
market segmentation. The  m represent the extent to which traders are not fully
diversiﬁed and hence the segmentation parameters determine the degree of risk sharing
in the economy. If  m = 0, traders are fully diversiﬁed and will have consumption equal
to the aggregate endowment cm,t = yt (i.e., full consumption insurance). But if  m =1 ,
traders are not at all diversiﬁed and will simply consume the dividends realized in their
speciﬁc market cm,t = ym,t (i.e., autarky).
Asset prices. To obtain asset prices, we use the ﬁrst-order condition of the family’s
optimization problem. Let µm,t   0 denote the Lagrange multiplier on (1), the family’s
budget constraint for market m at time t. We show in Appendix A that the family’s
Lagrangian can be written:
L = E0
 











qm,t :=  mµm,t +( 1   m)
  1
0
1    n
1   ¯  
µn,tdn (5)
is a weighted average of the Lagrange multipliers in market m and the multipliers
for other markets with weights reﬂecting the various degrees of market segmentation.
More speciﬁcally, qm,t is the marginal value to the family of earning one (real) dollar in
market m. The ﬁrst term in (5) arises because a fraction  m goes to the local trader,
with marginal utility µm,t. The second term arises because the remaining fraction
is shared among other family members, with marginal utility µn,t, according to their
relative contributions (1    n)/(1   ¯  ) to the family portfolio. We will refer to qm,t as
the state price of earning one real dollar in market m.
Just as equilibrium consumption in market m is a weighted average of the idiosyn-
cratic or “local” endowment and aggregate endowment with weights  m and 1  m,s o
too the state price for market m is a weighted average of the idiosyncratic multiplier




1    n
1   ¯  
µn,tdn, (6)
so that we can write qm,t =  mµm,t+(1  m)qt. If any particular market m has  m =0 ,
then the state price in that market is equal to the aggregate state price qm,t = qt and
is independent of the local endowment realization. If the segmentation parameter is
common across markets,  m =   all m,t h e nqt is the cross-sectional average marginal
utility and qt =
  1
0 qm,tdm. More generally, qt is not a simple average over µm,t since
di erent markets have di erent relative contributions (1    m)/(1   ¯  ) to the family
portfolio.













where the expectation is conditional on the family’s information at time t. This is a
standard equation, familiar from Lucas (1978), with the crucial distinction being that
the stochastic discount factor (SDF),  qm,t+1/qm,t, is market speciﬁc.
Note that, combining the formulas for equilibrium consumption (4), market-speciﬁc
state prices (5), and the pricing equation (8), we obtain a mapping from the primitives
of the economy (the  m, ym,t etc) into equilibrium asset prices. In particular, it is easy
to verify that the Lucas (1978) asset prices are obtained in the special case where  m =0
for all m,s ot h a tcm,t = yt and µm,t = u (yt) for all m and qt =
  1
0 u (yt)dn = u (yt).
Shadow prices of risk-free bonds. To simplify the presentation of the model, we
have not explicitly introduced risk-free assets. But we can still compute “shadow”
bond prices under the following convention. Let  k,t denote the price at time t of a
zero-coupon bond that pays one unit of the consumption good for sure at time t+k   1,
and that is held in the family portfolio. In Appendix A we show that, under appropriate
conditions, these bonds would have the price:








9with  0,t := 1. Bonds are priced using the aggregate state price, qt. In particular, the
one-period shadow gross risk-free rate is given by 1/ 1,t =1 /Et [ qt+1/qt]. Although the
one-period SDF for bonds,  qt+1/qt, does not depend on any particular idiosyncratic
endowment realization, it does depend on the distribution of idiosyncratic endowments
and in general is not simply the Lucas-Breeden SDF.
3C a l i b r a t i o n
To evaluate the signiﬁcance of these segmentation frictions, we calibrate the model.
3.1 Parameterization of the model
Preferences and endowments. Let period utility u(c) be of constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) with coe cient  >0s ot h a tu (c)=c  . The log aggregate endow-
ment is a random walk with drift and IID normal innovations:
loggt+1 := log(yt+1/yt) = log ¯ g +  g,t+1,  g,t+1   IID and N(0, 
2
 g), ¯ g>0. (10)
Log market-speciﬁc endowments are the log aggregate endowment plus an idiosyncratic
term:
logym,t := logyt + log ˆ ym,t, (11)
so that market-speciﬁc endowments inherit the trend in the aggregate endowment. The
log idiosyncratic endowment log ˆ ym,t is conditionally IID normal in the cross-section:





where  t follows the stochastic process speciﬁed below. The mean log idiosyncratic
endowment,   2
t/2 is chosen so that the cross-sectional average in level is normalized
to one, i.e.
  1
0 ˆ ym,t dm =1 .
Idiosyncratic endowment volatility. The cross-sectional standard deviation of the
log idiosyncratic endowment,  t, is stochastically varying. We specify it as an AR(1)
process in logs:
log t+1 =( 1   )log ¯   +  log t +  v,t+1,  v,t+1   IID and N(0, 
2
 v), ¯  >0. (13)
10For short, we refer to  t as idiosyncratic endowment volatility,b u tn o t et h a t t itself is
an aggregate state variable. At any point in time, the idiosyncratic endowment volatility,
 t, is the same in all markets m. In a frictionless model ( m = 0 all m), all idiosyncratic
risk would be diversiﬁed away so that asset prices would be independent of  t.I no t h e r
words, despite aggregate ﬂuctuations in the level of idiosyncratic endowment volatility,
 t, it would not be a priced factor. With segmentation frictions ( m > 0), by contrast,
both the level and dynamics of  t will a ect asset prices.
Information. For all that follows, we take family information at time t to be the
ﬁltration {Ft} 
t=0 generated by the volatility and the aggregate and idiosyncratic en-
dowment processes.
Solving the quantitative model. Since ˆ ym,t = ym,t/yt, we can use equation (4)t o
write equilibrium consumption in market m as the product of the aggregate endow-
ment, yt, and an idiosyncratic component that depends only on the local idiosyncratic
endowment realization, ˆ ym,t, and the amount of segmentation:
cm,t = [1 +  m(ˆ ym,t   1)]yt. (14)
Similarly, we can then use this expression for consumption and the fact that utility is
CRRA to write the local state price as:




 m,t :=  m[1 +  m(ˆ ym,t   1)]
   +( 1   m)
  1
0
1    n
1   ¯  
[1 +  n(ˆ yn,t   1)]
   dn. (16)
The SDF for market m is then:






This is the usual Lucas-Breeden aggregate SDF Mt+1 :=  g
  
t+1 with a market-speciﬁc
multiplicative “twisting” factor ˆ Mm,t+1 :=  m,t+1/ m,t that adjusts the SDF to account
for idiosyncratic endowment risk.
To solve the model in stationary variables, let ˆ pm,t := pm,t/yt denote the price-to-
aggregate-dividend ratio for market m. Dividing both sides of equation (8)b yyt > 0
11and using gt+1 := yt+1/yt, this ratio solves the Euler equation:







(ˆ pm,t+1 +ˆ ym,t+1)
 
, (18)
which is the standard CRRA formula except for the multiplicative adjustment  m,t+1/ m,t.
This is a linear integral equation to be solved for the unknown function mapping the
state into the price/dividend ratio. In general this integral equation cannot be solved
in closed form, but numerical solutions can be obtained in a straightforward manner
along the lines of Tauchen and Hussey (1991).2 We discuss these methods in greater
detail in Appendix B and Appendix C below.
3.2 Calibration strategy and results
We calibrate the model using monthly postwar data (1959:1-2007:12, unless otherwise
noted). Following a long tradition in the consumption-based asset pricing literature, we
interpret the aggregate endowment as per capita real personal consumption expenditure
on nondurables and services. We set ¯ g =( 1 .02)1/12 to match an annual 2% growth rate
and   g =0 .01/
 
12 to match an annual 1% standard deviation over the postwar sample.
We set   =( 0 .99)1/12 to reﬂect an annual pure rate of time preference of 1% and we
set the coe cient of relative risk aversion to   =4 .
For our benchmark calibration we assume that all markets in the economy share
the same segmentation parameter,   =  m for all m. Given the values for preference
parameters  ,  and the aggregate endowment growth process ¯ g,  g above, we still
need to assign values to this single   and the three parameters of the cross-sectional
endowment volatility process ¯  , ,  v.
Calibrating the idiosyncratic volatility process. The crucial consequence of
market segmentation is that local traders are forced to bear some idiosyncratic risk.
Thus, to explain the impact of market segmentation on risk premia, it is important
that our model generates realistic levels of idiosyncratic risk. This leads us to choose
the parameters of the stochastic process for idiosyncratic endowment volatility in order
to match key features of the volatility of a typical stock return. To see why there is a
2As noted by Flod` en (2008), Kopecky and Suen (2010)a n do t h e r s ,t h eTauchen and Hussey method
provides an accurate approximation so long as the underlying stochastic process is not too persistent,
which turns out to be the case in our calibration. As a robustness check, Appendix C shows that our
calibration results are unchanged when improving accuracy in two ways: using a larger number of
quadrature nodes for the log volatility process, and choosing quadrature nodes and weight according
to the modiﬁed Tauchen and Hussey formula advocated by Flod` en.
12natural mapping between the two volatilities, write the gross returno ns t o c km as:
Rm,t = gt
ˆ ym,t +ˆ pm,t
ˆ pm,t 1
. (19)
Thus, the volatility of ˆ ym,t directly a ects stock returns through the dividend term of
the numerator. It also indirectly a ects stock returns through the asset price, ˆ pm,t.
We obtain key statistics about stock return volatility from Goyal and Santa-Clara
(2003). Their measure of monthly stock volatility is obtained by adding up thec r o s s -
sectional stock return dispersion over each day of the previous month.3 In Figure 2 we
show the monthly time series (1963:1-2001:12) of their measure of the cross-sectional
standard deviation of stock returns, as updated by Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang (2005).













percent deviation from trend
Figure 2: Cross-sectional standard deviation of stock returns, deviation from trend.
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered cross-sectional standard deviation of stock returns, monthly (1963:1-2001:12). Data from
Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), updated by Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang (2005).
We choose the idiosyncratic endowment volatility process so that, when we calculate
the same stock return volatility measure in our model, we replicate three key features
of this data: the unconditional average return volatility of 16.4% monthly, the uncon-
3Because they don’t subtract the mean return, Goyal and Santa-Clara recognize that their measure
of dispersion is biased upward. However, they note (page 979) that for “short holding periods, the
impact of subtracting the means is minimal. Even for monthly excess returns, the expected squared
return overstates the variance by less than one percent of its level. The advantage of this approach, of
course, is that it allows us to sidestep the issue of estimating the means t o c kr e t u r n s ” .
13ditional standard deviation of return volatility 4.17% monthly, and AR(1) coe cient
of return volatility 0.84 monthly. We replicate these three features by simultaneously
choosing the three parameters governing the stochastic process for endowment volatil-
ity: the unconditional average ¯  , the innovation standard deviation   v,a n dt h eA R ( 1 )
coe cient  .
Calibrating the segmentation parameter. The segmentation parameter   gov-
erns the extent to which local traders can diversify away the return volatility of their
local asset. Thus,   determines the extent to which the volatility factor,  t,h a sa n
impact on asset prices and creates systematic variation in asset returns. This leads us
to identify   using a measure of systematic volatility, speciﬁcally the 4.16% monthly
standard deviation of the real value-weighted return of NYSE stocks from CRSP.
To understand precisely how the identiﬁcation works, recall ﬁrst what would happen
in the absence of market segmentation,   = 0. Then, we would be back in the Lucas-
Mehra and Prescott model with IID lognormal aggregate endowment growth. As is well
known (see, e.g., LeRoy, 2006), this model can’t generate realistic amounts of systematic
volatility. Speciﬁcally, with   = 0 the return from a diversiﬁed market portfolio is
gt(1 + ¯ p)/¯ p where ¯ p =  E[g1  ]/(1    E[g1  ]) is the constant price/dividend ratio for
the aggregate market. With our standard parameterization of thep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r s
and aggregate endowment growth, (1 + ¯ p)/¯ p   1.0058 so that the monthly standard
deviation of the diversiﬁed market portfolio return is approximately the same as the
monthly standard deviation of aggregate endowment growth, about 0.29% monthly as
opposed to 4.16% monthly in the data.
In contrast with the   =0c a s e ,w h e n >0 idiosyncratic endowment volatility
creates systematic volatility. Indeed, because of persistence, a high idiosyncratic en-
dowment volatility this month predicts a high idiosyncratic endowment volatility next
month. Thus in every market m local traders expect to bear more idiosyncratic risk,
and because of risk aversion the price/dividend ratio ˆ pm,t = pm,t/yt has to go down
everywhere. Because this e ect impacts all stocks at the same time, it endogenously
creates systematic return volatility. Clearly, the e ect is greater if marketsa r em o r e
segmented and traders are forced to bear more idiosyncratic risk: a larger   will result
in a larger increase in systematic volatility.
Calibration results. The calibrated parameters are listed in Table 1.I no u rb e n c h -
mark calibration, the level of   is 0.31. That is, 31% of idiosyncratic endowment risk
is non-tradeable. In terms of portfolio weights, we also ﬁnd that   =0 .31 implies that,
in a typical market m, a trader invests approximately 31% of his wealth in the local
14asset and the rest in the family portfolio.4 Table 2 shows that with these parameters,
the benchmark model matches the target moments exactly. The calibrated parame-
ters of the cross-sectional endowment volatility process are an unconditional average
of ¯   =0 .32, an AR(1) coe cient of   =0 .78 monthly, and an innovation standard
deviation of   v =0 .21 monthly.
4Q u a n t i t a t i v e e x a m p l e s
Aggregate statistics. In comparing our model to data, we adopt the perspective
of an econometrician who observes a collection of asset returns but who ignores the
possibility of market segmentation. In particular, to make our results comparable to
those typically reported in the empirical asset pricing literature, we focus on the prop-
erties of the aggregate market portfolio. We deﬁne the gross market return RM,t+1 :=
(pt+1 + yt+1)/pt where pt :=
  1
0 pm,t dm is the ex-dividend value of the market portfolio
and yt is the aggregate endowment. We deﬁne the shadow gross one-period risk-free
rate by Rf,t := Et[ qt+1/qt] 1 where qt is the aggregate state price that determines the
price of risk-free bonds, as in (9). Implicitly, bonds are priced as if they are traded in
their own frictionless “  = 0” market, but the pricing of such bonds takes into account
 >0 in other asset markets.5
We then calculate the unconditional equity risk premium E[RM,t+1  Rf,t] and sim-
ilarly for other statistics. We call pt/yt the price/dividend ratio of the market.
4.1 Results
Equity premium. With these deﬁnitions in mind, Table 3 shows our model’s impli-
cations for aggregate returns and price/dividend ratios. We report annualized monthly
statistics from the model and compare these to annualized monthly returns and to
annual price/dividend ratios. (We use annual data for price/dividends because of the
pronounced seasonality in dividends at the monthly frequency.) The benchmark model
produces an annual equity risk premium of 2.4% annual as opposed to about 5.4% an-
nual in the postwar NYSE CRSP data. Clearly this is a much larger equity premium
than is produced by a standard Lucas-Mehra and Prescott model. For comparison,
that model with risk aversion   = 4 and IID consumption growth with annual standard
4The derivation of portfolio weights for the family is given in Appendix A below.
5An alternative approach would be to deﬁne a market-speciﬁc risk-free rate Rf,m,t :=
Et[ qm,t+1/qm,t] 1 for market m and then an average risk-free rate by Rf,t :=
  1
0 Rf,m,tdm.I n
this interpretation, Rf,m,t measures the local real risk free opportunity cost of funds in market m.I n
our benchmark with  m =   for all m, both approaches give the same average risk-free rate Rf,t.
15deviation of 1% produces an annual equity premium of about 0.04%. The segmented
markets model with   =0 .31 is able to generate an equity premium some two orders
of magnitude larger.
Why is there a large equity premium? Relative to standard consumption-based
asset pricing models with time-separable expected utility preferences, our model delivers
a large equity premium. Is it a direct consequence of our strategy of picking   in order
to match systematic return volatility? No, since model risk premia areg e n e r a t e db y
covariances: no matter how much return volatility you feed into a model, the equity
risk premia will be zero if the model’s SDF is not negatively correlated withr e t u r n
variation (see Cochrane and Hansen, 1992,f o raf o r c e f u la r g u m e n t ) .
What, then, is the equity premium from the point of view of aggregatec o n s u m p -
tion? In our model, if one computes the unconditional average equity premium using
the model generated market return and the Lucas-Breeden SDF  g
  
t+1 instead of the
true model SDF, the equity premium is on the order of 0.04% (4 basis points) annual
rather than the 2.4% annual in the benchmark model. While aggregate consumption
does not command a big risk premium, the volatility factor does. To see this, consider
the premium implied by the SDF,  qt+1/qt,w h e r eqt is the aggregate state price that
determines the (shadow) price of risk-free bonds. In general this is given by equa-
tion (6) but with a single common   it reduces to qt =
  1




m,t dm,t h e
cross-sectional average marginal utility. In our benchmark model, this SDF implies an
equity premium of 2.05% annual. This comes from the convexity of the marginal util-
ity function: a high realization of  t makes equilibrium consumption highly dispersed
across markets so that average marginal utilities are high. At the same time, a high  t
depresses asset prices in every market, so the return on the market portfolio is low.
Level of the risk-free rate. Although the benchmark model delivers reasonable
implications for the level of the equity premium, it is not so successful on other di-
mensions. The level of the risk-free rate is very high as compared tot h ed a t a .I nt h e
model the risk free rate is about 8% annual while in the data it is more like2 % . A s
emphasized by Weil (1989), this is a common problem for models with expected-utility
preferences. In short, attempts to address the equity premium puzzle by increasing risk
aversion also tend to raise the risk-free rate so that even if it’s possible to match the
equity premium, the model may well do so at absolute levels of returns that are too
high. This e ect comes from the relationship between real interest rates and growth in a
deterministic setting with expected utility: high risk aversion means low intertemporal
elasticity of substitution so that it takes high real interest rates to compensate for high
16aggregate growth. With risk, there is an o setting precautionary savings e ect that
could, in principle, pull the risk-free rate back down to more realistic levels. But in our
calibration this precautionary savings e ect is quantitatively small: raising   from zero
(the Mehra and Prescott case) to   =0 .31 (our benchmark) lowers the risk-free rate
by about 1% annual.
Volatility of the risk-free rate. In the data, the risk-free rate is smooth and the
volatility of the equity premium reﬂects the volatility of equity returns. In the bench-
mark model, the risk-free rate is too volatile, about 5.6% annual as opposed to 1.2%
annual in the data.
Yield curve. With IID lognormal aggregate growth and CRRA utility, the average
yield curve in a standard asset pricing model is ﬂat. By contrast, ourm o d e lg e n e r a t e s
an increasing and concave average yield curve, as shown in Figure 3. This shape comes
from the relationship between the aggregate state price qt and aggregate volatility  t.
Since  t has positive serial correlation but is not a random walk, its ﬁrst di erence
is negatively serially correlated. This negative serial correlation is inherited by the
one-period bond pricing SDF,  qt+1/qt, and, as is well known, this has the desirable
implication that the average yield curve is upward sloping (see Backus and Zin, 1994,
for example).
































Figure 3: Average yield curve for the benchmark model.




.N o t et h a t ,b e c a u s et h e
risk free rate is so volatile and because log(·)i sc o n c a v e ,t h i sy i e l dt u r n so u tt ob ea b o u t1 %l o w e rt h a nt h eaverage risk
free rate reported in Table 3.
17Price/dividend ratio. The benchmark model produces an annual price/dividend
ratio of about 14 as opposed to an unconditional average of more like 34 in the NYSE
CRSP data. Given the large, persistent swings in the price/dividend ratio in the data,
what constitutes success on this dimension is not entirely clear. The model generates
too little unconditional volatility in the log price/dividend ratio, some 21%a n n u a l
as opposed to 39% in the data. Also, the temporal composition of price/dividend
volatility di ers somewhat between the model and the data. In particular, the log
price/dividend ratio has approximately no persistence at annual frequencies, 0.7612 =
0.04 in the benchmark model, which is considerably lower than the corresponding annual
persistence 0.9912 =0 .89 in the data. That is, the unconditional volatility of the
price/dividend ratio in the data comes from large, low-frequency movements whereas
the unconditional volatility in the model comes from high-frequency movements.
4.2 Discussion
Constant endowment volatility. Our benchmark model has two departures from
a standard consumption-based asset pricing model: segmentation and a time-varying
endowment volatility. To show that both these departures are essential for our results,
we solved our model with constant endowment volatility, i.e.,  t =   for all t.F o r
this exercise, we ﬁx the volatility at the same level as the unconditional average from
the benchmark model, ¯   =0 .32, and keep the level of segmentation at the benchmark
  =0 .31. In Table 2 we show that this “constant  ” version of the model produces
essentially the same amount of unconditional cross-sectional stock return volatility as
in the data (suggesting that this moment is principally determined by ¯   alone), but
produces relatively little systematic stock volatility. In particular, systematic stock
volatility is only about 1% monthly as opposed to 4% in the data. And recall that, for
our preference and aggregate growth parameters, a standard Lucas-Mehra and Prescott
model would imply negligible systematic stock volatility. Thus  >0 is necessary but
not su cient for our model to create systematic stock volatility from idiosyncratic
endowment volatility. In Table 3 we see that the model with constant   generates an
equity premium of about 0.2% annual, an order of magnitude more than in a standard
model. Time variation in endowment volatility increases the equity premium further,
generating another 2.2% on top of the constant   case, for a total of 2.4% annual.
Counter-cyclical endowment volatility. Many measures of cross-sectional idiosyn-
cratic risk increase in recessions (see, for example Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu,
2001; Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2004). This counter-cyclicality is also a feature
18of the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns data from Goyal and Santa-Clara
(2003). However, the stochastic process we use for the cross-sectional volatility evolves
independently of aggregate growth. To see if our results are sensitive to this, we modify
the stochastic process in (13)t o :
log t+1 =( 1   )log ¯   +  log t    (loggt   log ¯ g)+ v,t+1 (20)
with  v,t+1 IID normal, as before. If  >0, then aggregate growth below trend in
period t increases the likelihood that volatility is above trend in period t +1s ot h a t
volatility is counter-cyclical. We identify the new parameter   by requiring that, in a
monthly regression of the cross-sectional standard deviation of stock returns on lagged
aggregate growth, the regression coe cient is  0.56 as it is in the data. The calibrated
parameters for this “feedback” version of the model are also shown in Table 1.T h e
calibrated elasticity,  , is 2.5 so aggregate growth 1% below trend tends to increase
endowment volatility by 2.5%. The other calibrated parameters are indistinguishable
from the benchmark parameters. Moreover, the model’s implications for asset prices
as shown in Table 3 are also very close to the results for the benchmark model. This
suggests that, while the model can be reconciled with the counter-cyclical behavior of
cross-sectional stock volatility, this feature is not necessary for our main results.
Relationship to incomplete markets models. There is a large literature in macroe-
conomics that analyzes the asset pricing implications of market incompleteness when
households receive uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks.6 One might have the im-
pression that all our model does is shift the focus of incomplete markets models: instead
of analyzing the idiosyncratic labor income risk facing households, all we do is analyze
the idiosyncratic income risk faced by the ﬁnancial sector. We now argue that, while
our segmented markets model indeed results in uninsurable shocks, it is conceptually
di erent from standard incomplete markets models.
To see why, note that in standard incomplete markets models the intertemporal




As forcefully emphasized by Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Du e (1996)a n d
Kruger and Lustig (2010), idiosyncratic risk has no impact on the equity premium
when utility is CRRA and idiosyncratic consumption growth is statistically indepen-
6See Telmer (1993)a n dHeaton and Lucas (1996) for important early examples.
19dent from aggregate consumption growth. Indeed, in that case the IMRS can be fac-
tored into ˆ MiM,w h e r eM =  g   is the standard Lucas-Breeden SDF, and ˆ Mi is an
idiosyncratic component that is independent from M. Expanding the expectation in
(21)w eh a v e :
E[ ˆ MiMR
e]=E[ ˆ Mi]E[MR
e]+C o v [ˆ Mi,MR
e]=0 .




As shown by Kocherlakota (1996), this asset pricing equation cannot rationalize the
observed equity premium.
In our benchmark model we maintain the assumption that the idiosyncratic compo-
nent of dividends, ˆ ym, is statistically independent from aggregate consumption growth.
Despite this, we obtain a much larger equity premium than Mehra and Prescott (1985).
The reason is that in our asset pricing model the local SDF does not have to price the
excess return on the aggregate market portfolio, as in equation (21), but instead price
the excess return on the local asset market. The local discount factor is correlated with
the local excess return (through the local endowment realization) and this makes it
impossible to strip out the inﬂuence of the market-speciﬁc factor.




where Mm is the local SDF and Re
m is the local excess return. From equation (17)w e
can factor the local discount factor into ˆ MmM where M is again the Lucas-Breeden
discount factor and ˆ Mm is a market-speciﬁc factor. Now proceeding as above and





m]+C o v [ˆ Mm,MR
e
m]=0 .
But ˆ Mm and Re
m depend on the same local risk factor so Cov[ ˆ Mm,MR e
m]  =0a n dw e
cannot factor out E[ ˆ Mm]. Because this makes it impossible to aggregate the collection
of equations (22) into (21), the standard incomplete markets logic does not apply in
our model.
205C r o s s - s e c t i o n a l v o l a t i l i t i e s
In our ﬁrst set of quantitative examples we used a common amount of segmentation,
 , for all asset markets. This implies that, conditional on the aggregate state of the
economy, each market m is characterized by a common amount of volatility (essentially
determined by the economy-wide  t and  ) so that there is no cross-sectional variation
in volatility. We now pursue the implications of the general model with market-speciﬁc
 m and hence a non-degenerate cross-section of volatility.
Speciﬁcally, we allow for a ﬁnite number N of market types. In a slight abuse of
notation we continue to index these market types by m  { 1,...,N}.W ea s s u m et h a t
each market contains the same number of assets. There is a total measure  m of traders
in market m, with
 N
m=1  m = 1. The supply of assets per trader is normalized to 1.
With this notation, then, the aggregate endowment is y =
 N
m=1 ym m.
Calibration of market-speciﬁc  m:s t r a t e g y . In the case of a single common  
above, the value of   was identiﬁed by matching a measure of systematic volatility,
the return volatility of a well-diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks. We now need to identify a
vector of N segmentation parameters and we do this using a closely related strategy. In
particular, we identify market types with quintile portfolios of stockss o r t e do nm e a s u r e s
of idiosyncratic volatility from Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). They compute
value-weighted quintile portfolios by sorting stocks based on idiosyncratic volatility
relative to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor pricing model in postwar CRSP
data. To give a sense of this data, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang report an average
standard deviation of (diversiﬁed) portfolio returns for the ﬁrst quintile of stocks of 3.8%
monthly (as opposed to 4.2% for the market as a whole). By construction this portfolio
is 20% of a simple count of stocks but it constitutes 54% of the market by value. At
the other end of the volatility spectrum, the average monthly standard deviation of a
well-diversiﬁed portfolio of the ﬁfth quintile of stocks is 8.2% and these constitute only
about 2% of the market by value.
We choose the value of  m for each m  { 1,...,5} to match the total volatility
of the m’th quintile portfolio in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang. Similarly, we choose
values of  m so that the unconditional average portfolio weight of the family in assets
of market m matches the average market share for the m’th quintile portfolio from
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang. Our calibration procedure chooses these parameters
simultaneously with the parameters ¯  , ,  v of the stochastic process for cross-sectional
endowment volatility. We keep the values of the preference parameters  ,  and the
aggregate growth parameters ¯ g,  g at their benchmark values. If there was only one
21market type, then this calibration procedure would coincide with the procedure used
for our benchmark model above.
Calibration of market-speciﬁc  m:r e s u l t s . The calibrated parameters from this
procedure are listed in Panel A of Table 4.W eﬁ n dt h a tt h em = 1 market, with the
lowest idiosyncratic volatility, has a segmentation parameter  1 =0 .01. These assets
are close to frictionless. This m = 1 market consists of 20% of assets by number,
by construction, but it accounts for 51% of the total market by value. By contrast,
the m = 5 market has segmentation parameter  5 =0 .37 but accounts for only 2%
of total market value. Across markets, the segmentation parameters,  m,a r em o n o -
tonically increasing in m while the weights,  m, are monotonically decreasing in m.
Averaging over the ﬁve markets, ¯   =
 5
m=1  m m =0 .115. Thus this economy, which
matches the same aggregate moments as the benchmark model, hits its targets with
an average amount of segmentation ¯   =0 .115, roughly one-third that of the single pa-
rameter benchmark   =0 .31. This suggests that there may be a signiﬁcant bias when
aggregating a collection of heterogeneously segmented markets into a “representative”
segmented market.
Relative to the benchmark, the model’s endowment volatility process now has a sub-
stantially higher unconditional average, approximately the same time-series variation,
and more persistence. Table 4 shows that with these parameters the model matches the
target moments closely but not exactly. In particular, while the average idiosyncratic
volatility across the 5 markets is about the same as in the data, this is achieved with
slight discrepancies at the level of each market, e.g., the 1st market has volatility of
4.2% against 3.8% in the data.
Market-speciﬁc asset pricing implications. In Panel A of Table 5 we show the
risk premia for each market type in the model and their empirical counterparts. In the
data, the equity premium for the low volatility m = 1 market is 0.53% monthly (roughly
6.5% annual) whereas in the model it is 0.17% monthly. This market accounts for half
of total market value. As we go to markets with higher volatility, the model predicts
that risk premia monotonically increase, reaching 0.53% monthly for the m =5m a r k e t .
However, the data predicts a hump-shaped pattern for the cross-section of equity premia,
with the premia reaching a maximum at about 0.69% monthly for the m =3m a r k e t
before falling to  0.53% for the 5th and most volatile market. The model fails to
account for the negative risk premium of the smallest, highest idiosyncratic volatility
markets.
22Aggregate asset pricing implications. In Panel B of Table 5 we show the aggre-
gate asset pricing implications of the model with market-speciﬁc  m.T h e a g g r e g a t e
equity premium is 2.9%, about 0.50% higher than in the benchmark single   model,
despite the fact that the average segmentation here is only ¯   =0 .115, one-third the
single   benchmark. For comparison, the table shows the asset pricing implications
for an otherwise identical single   economy with   = ¯   =0 .115. The aggregation of
the micro segmentation frictions across the di erent markets adds some 1.2% annual to
the equity premium, taking it from 1.7% to 2.9%. Compared to the benchmark model,
the risk-free rate has about the same level and is slightly less volatile (though still too
volatile compared to the data).
6C o n c l u s i o n
We propose a tractable consumption-based model in order to explain and quantify
the macro impact of ﬁnancial market frictions. We envision an economy comprised of
many micro ﬁnancial markets that are partially segmented from one another. Because
of segmentation, traders in each micro market have to bear some local idiosyncratic risk.
Assets in each market are priced by a convex combination of the marginal utility of a
local trader specialized in that asset (who has to bear some of the idiosyncratic risk of
that asset), and the economy-wide average marginal utility (reﬂecting the diversiﬁcation
of the remaining idiosyncratic risk in a large portfolio). We calibrate them o d e lw h e n
all markets share the same level of segmentation and show that it can generate a
sizeable equity premium. We also allow segmentation to di er across markets and show
that aggregation matters: we can obtain essentially the same aggregate asset pricing
implication with a much smaller average level of segmentation.
23Technical Appendix
AG e n e r a l m o d e l w i t h d e t a i l e d d e r i v a t i o n s
We add three features relative to the model presented in the main text: (i) for each
market m there is a density  m   0 of traders, (ii) the asset supply is Sm   0, not
normalized to 1, and (iii) there are bonds in positive net supply held in the family
portfolio. The total measure of traders is one, i.e.,
  1
0
 m dm =1 . (23)
The average segmentation parameters is then taken to be ¯   :=
  1
0  m m dm.E a c h
period one share of the asset produces a stochastic realization of a non-storable dividend




ym,tSm m dm. (24)
As in the text, traders in market m are assumed to bear an exogenous fraction  m   [0,1]
of the expense of purchasing assets in that market and in return receive  m of the beneﬁt.
The remaining 1  m of the expenses and the beneﬁts is borne by the family. As show
in the text, this results in a sequential budget constraint of the form:
cm,t +  mpm,tsm,t+1 +( 1   m)Tt+1    m(pm,t + ym,t)sm,t +( 1   m)Tt    m,t, (25)
where the new term,  m,t, is a lump-sum tax levied on market m by the government.
As in the main text, Tt and Tt+1 represent, respectively, the cum-dividend value of
the family portfolio brought into the period and the ex-dividend value of the family
portfolio acquired this period. Proceeding as in the text, we ﬁnd that Tt and Tt+1
satisfy:
(1   ¯  )Tt =
  1
0




(1   ¯  )Tt+1 =
  1
0




where  k,t and bk,t denote the price and quantity of purchases of zero-coupon bonds
that pay the family one (real) dollar for sure in k periods’ time.
24Government. The government collects lump-sum taxes from each market and issues










 m,t m dm, (26)
where Bk,t denotes the government’s issue of k-period bonds at time t   1. We choose
a particular speciﬁcation of lump-sum taxes that has the property of not redistributing
resources across markets:
 m,t =
1    m





 k,t[Bk+1,t   Bk,t+1]
 
. (27)
Equilibrium allocations. Market clearing requires sm,t+1 = Sm for each m and
bk,t+1 = Bk,t+1 for each k. We plug these conditions in the market-speciﬁc budget con-
straints and then use the government budget constraint combined with the expressions
(27) for lump-sum taxes. After cancelling common terms we get:
cm,t =  mym,tSm +( 1   m)
  1
0
1    n
1   ¯  
yn,tSn n dn.
First-order conditions and asset pricing. Let µm,t   0 denote the multiplier on
the budget constraint for market m and use the market-speciﬁc budget constraints and
accounting identities for the family portfolio to write the Lagrangian:
L = E0












Bm,t = m(pm,t + ym,t)sm,t
+
1    m
1   ¯  
   1
0







cm,t +  mpm,tsm,t+1 +
1    m
1   ¯  
   1
0








25Now collecting terms in
  1
















1    m












1    m
1   ¯  
  1
0
(1    n)
 
(pn,t + yn,t)sn,t   pn,tsn,t+1
 
 n m dndm.
Now, in the last term, we permute the roles of the symbols m and n and then interchange




1    n
1   ¯  
  1
0
(1    m)[(pm,t + ym,t)sm,t   pm,tsm,t+1] m n dmdn
=
   1
0
µn,t
1    n
1   ¯  
 n dn
   1
0
(1    m)[(pm,t + ym,t)sm,t   pm,tsm,t+1] m dm.
Next, deﬁne the weighted average of Lagrange multipliers:
qm,t :=  mµm,t +( 1   m)qt, and qt :=
  1
0
1    n
1   ¯  
µn,t n dn,
as in the main text. Substituting for qm,t and qt we get:
L = E0







u(cm,t)+qm,t(pm,t + ym,t)sm,t   qm,tpm,tsm,t+1










Apart from the term reﬂecting the presence of bonds, this is the same Langrangian as
in the main text. We take derivatives (point-wise) to obtain the ﬁrst-order necessary
conditions reported in the main text.
Portfolio weights and returns. To streamline the exposition we return to the model
used in the main text. The total value of the family portfolio is:
  1
0
1    m
1   ¯  
pm,tsm,t+1 dm.
26Thus, in the family portfolio, asset m is represented with a weight:
 m,t :=
1  m




1 ¯   pn,tsn,t+1 dn
.
Letting Rm,t+1 =( pm,t+1 + ym,t+1)/pm,t be the return on asset m,t h er e t u r no nt h e





Now recall that trader m holds  mpm,tsm,t+1 real dollars of asset m,a n dt h er e s to f
his investment:
(1    m)
  1
0
1    n
1   ¯  
pn,tsn,t+1 dn,
is in the family portfolio. Thus, the return of trader’s m portfolio can be written:








1 ¯   pn,tsn,t+1 dn
,
is the portfolio weight in the local asset.
BC o m p u t a t i o n a l d e t a i l s
Information. The aggregate state is a VAR for log consumption growth and log
idiosyncratic volatility:
loggt+1 =( 1    )log ¯ g +  loggt +  g,t+1
log t+1 =( 1    )log ¯   +  log t    (loggt   log ¯ g)+ v,t+1,
where 0    ,  < 1 and where the two components of innovation,  g,t+1 and  v,t+1,a r e
assumed to be contemporaneously uncorrelated. The dividend in market m is:
logym,t = logyt + log ˆ ym,t, (28)
where the log idiosyncratic component is conditionally IID normal in the cross section:





 mt =  tˆ  m,
27for some time-invariant market speciﬁc volatility level ˆ  m.
Setup. Let utility be CRRA with coe cient  >0s ou (c)=c  .A s s u m em a r k e t s
come in N di erent types m  { 1,...,N}. Note that this is an abuse of notation given
that we previously used m to index a single market within the [0,1] continuum. There
is an equal measure of assets, 1/N, in each market type. The total measure of traders
in a market of type m is denoted by  m. Thus, we have the restriction:
N  
m=1
 m =1 .
The supply of asset per trader in a market of type m is Sm, so the total supply in that
market is Sm m. The dividend is ym,t = ytˆ ym,t where E[ˆ ym,t |gt,  t] = 1. Since the
aggregate endowment is yt, we need to impose the restriction:
N  
m=1
Sm m =1 .
The segmentation parameter in a market of type m is  m and the supply per trader is
Sm. In equilibrium, consumption in a market of type m is given by:
cm,t = yt (Am + Bmˆ ym,t),
where
Am := (1    m)
N  
n=1
1    n
1   ¯  
Sn n,
and
Bm :=  mSm.
We then have qm,t =  m,ty
  
t where:
 m,t =  m (Am + Bmˆ ym,t)
   +( 1   m)
N  
n=1
1    n
1   ¯  
E
 
(An + Bnˆ yn,t)
   |gt,  t
 
 n,
where, by the LLN, the conditional expectation on the right–hand side calculates the
cross-sectional average of (An + Bnˆ yn,t)   within type n markets. We explain below
how to compute this expectation. Now let ˆ pm,t := pm,t/yt be the price/dividend ratio
in a type m market. This solves:







(ˆ pm,t+1 +ˆ ym,t+1)
 
. (29)
28Approximation. Each market is characterized by 3 states: two aggregate states
(g, ) and one idiosyncratic state ˆ ym (to simplify notation, we omit the ‘log’). Given
the speciﬁcation above, the transition density is of the form:
f(g
 , 
 , ˆ y
 |g, ,ˆ y)=f(g
 , 
  |g, )f(ˆ y
 | 
 ).
Our approximation follows Tauchen and Hussey (1991). First, we pick quadrature
nodes and weights for the aggregate state: consumption growth, Qg and Wg (column
vectors of size Ng) and volatility, Q  and W  (column vectors of size N ).
In their original paper, Tauchen and Hussey recommended to pick these nodes and
weights according to the transition density evaluated at the mean, i.e., a bivariate
Gaussian density f(g ,    |¯ g,¯  ) which in the present case is the product of two inde-
pendent normal densities with means log ¯ g and log ¯  , respectively, and variances  2
g
and  2
v. Subsequent work has highlighted, however, that when the Markov chain being
approximated is highly persistent, the quality of the approximation may be poor. In
our calibration exercise, this problem may arise when the moment matching algorithm
searches in the region where the volatility process,  , is highly persistent (  close to 1).
To alleviate this concern we follow Flod` en (2008): we generate nodes and weights for
  based on a “twisted” Gaussian density with a higher standard deviation:
  = w v +( 1  w)
 v  
1    2 where w =1 /2+ /4. (30)
We also use a larger number of nodes to better capture the impact of high realization of
 .S e eAppendix C below for further discussion of the robustness of the approximation,
and Table 7 for the results of our robustness analysis.
Next, for every quadrature value of  , we generate quadrature nodes and weights
in each market type m for the log idiosyncratic state log ˆ y, according to a Gaussian
density with mean  ˆ  2
m 2/2 and variance ˆ  2
m 2. The resulting nodes and weights
column vectors have length N    Nˆ y and we denote them by Qm
ˆ y |  and W m
ˆ y | .I nt h e s e
vectors of nodes and weights, we adopt the convention that “idiosyncratic endowment
comes ﬁrst”. That is, in the quadrature node vector, idiosyncratic endowment i under
volatility j is found in entry i + Nˆ y(j   1).
Now, if we combine idiosyncratic endowment, aggregate volatility, anda g g r e g a t e
endowment growth together we obtain, for each market type m, a ﬁnite state space
that we index by n  { 1,2,3,...N s},w h e r e
Ns := Nˆ y   N    Ng.
We adopt the convention that the state of idiosyncratic endowment i  { 1,...,Nˆ y},
volatility j  { 1,...,N  }, and aggregate consumption growth k  { 1,...,N g} corre-
spond to state:
n = i + Nˆ y(j   1) + Nˆ yN (k   1).
29In each state, the value of idiosyncratic endowment, aggregate volatility, and aggregate
consumption growth can be conveniently represented with Kronecker products of the
quadrature nodes:
Vg = Qg   eN    eNy
V  = eNg   Q    eNy
V
m
ˆ y = eNg   Q
m
ˆ y | ,
where eNx denotes a Nx   1 vector of ones. By construction, entry n of vector Vg
contains consumption growth if the state of market m is n, and similarly for V  and
V m
ˆ y . The corresponding quadrature weights are obtained as follows. We let:
A = Wg   eN    eNy
B = eNg   W    eNy
C
m = eNg   W
m
ˆ y | ,
so that the quadrature weights for the state are:
W
m = A.   B.  C
m
where .  denotes Matlab coordinate-per-coordinate product.
Transition probability matrix. To implement the method of Tauchen and Hussey






 )   f( 
 | ,g)   f(g
 |g),
as well as the quadrature weighting function:
 
m(s)= 
m(ˆ y| )    ( )    (g),
which is the probability density function used above to generate the quadrature nodes
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which we then normalize so that the rows sum to 1.
30Calculating cross-sectional moments. In many instances in the program we need
to calculate:
E[xm |g, ],
for some random variable xm. To do this, we consider:
K  =( INg N    e
 




m = eNg   W
m
ˆ y | .
The coordinate-wise product multiplies each realization of xm by its probability condi-
tional on (g, ), and the pre-multiplication adds up. We then re-Kroneckerize this in
order to obtain a Ns   1v e c t o r :
K    eNˆ y.
CR o b u s t n e s s o f t h e a p p r o x i m a t i o n
Table 7 illustrates that our numerical results are robust to alternative parameterizations
of the numerical approximations. We consider three versions of the single   economy:
the benchmark version, the version with constant  , and the feedback version with
counter-cyclical  t. In our default standard parameterization we have N = Ng   N   
Nˆ y =3  9   19 = 513 quadrature nodes and weights. It also uses the “twisted”
density recommended by Flod` en (2008) to alleviate concerns about the accuracy of the
Tauchen and Hussey (1991)p r o c e d u r ew h e nt h e t process is persistent (see equation
(30) in Appendix B). In our high precision parameterization we have N = Ng   N   
Nˆ y =5  19 25 = 2,375 nodes and weights and again use the twisting recommended by
Flod` en.I nt h eno twist parameterization we use the plain Tauchen and Hussey (1991)
procedure and the same conﬁguration of nodes as in the standard parameterization.
The issue of twisting does not arise in the constant   model.
For each of these numerical approximations the table reports the calibrated param-
eter values, the values of the moments we target, and the implications for aggregate
asset prices.
For a given model, we see that increasing the number of nodes from the standard to
high parameterization has negligible e ect on the results. Similarly, the twisting recom-
mended by Flod` en has negligible e ect. This suggests that our calibrated stochastic pro-
cess is not persistent enough to cause any problems for the plain Tauchen and Hussey
procedure.
31Panel A: Preferences and aggregate endowment growth.
Parameter Monthly value Notes
  0.9992 discount rate 1% annual
  4 coe cient relative risk aversion
¯ g 1.0017 average aggregate growth 2% annual
  g 0.0029 std dev aggregate growth 1% annual
Panel B: Segmentation and idiosyncratic endowment volatility.
Model
Parameter Benchmark Constant Feedback Data moment
  0.310 0.310 0.310 std dev diversiﬁed market portfolio return 4.16% monthly
¯   0.318 0.318 0.318 average cross-section std dev returns 16.40% monthly
  v 0.207 0 0.207 time-series std dev cross-section std dev returns 4.17% monthly
  0.784 0 0.785 AR(1) cross-section std dev returns 0.84 monthly
  n/a n/a 2.513 cross-section std dev returns on lagged growth  0.56 in monthly data
Table 1: Parameter choices.
The top panel shows our parameters for preferences and aggregate endowment growth. These parameters are kept the same in all calculations. The bottom panel shows our
parameters for segmentation and the idiosyncratic endowment volatility process  t and the moments in the Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003)c r o s s - s e c t i o n a ls t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no f
stock returns data that they are chosen to match. The Benchmark model has a single common segmentation parameter   and time-varying idiosyncratic endowment volatility
 t.T h eC o n s t a n t  model sets  t =¯   i.e., to the Benchmark unconditional mean, for all t.T h eF e e d b a c km o d e lh a scounter-cyclical endowment volatility, with feedback from
aggregate growth gt to volatility  t governed by the elasticity  .S e et h em a i nt e x tf o rf u r t h e rd e t a i l s .
3
2Model
Moment Data Benchmark Constant Feedback
std dev diversiﬁed market portfolio return 4.16 4.16 1.01 4.16
average cross-section std dev returns 16.40 16.40 16.03 16.35
time-series std dev cross-section std dev returns 4.17 4.17 0 4.17
AR(1) cross-section std dev returns 0.84 0.84 n/a 0.84
regression cross-section std dev returns on lagged growth  0.56 n/a n/a  0.56
Table 2: Fit of calibrated models.
Our target moments in the US monthly postwar Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003)c r o s s - s e c t i o n a ls t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no fs t o c kr e t u r n sd a t aand their model counterparts. The
Benchmark model has a single common segmentation parameter   and time-varying idiosyncratic endowment volatility  t.T h e C o n s t a n t   model sets  t =¯   i.e., to the
Benchmark unconditional mean, for all t.T h eF e e d b a c km o d e lh a scounter-cyclical endowment volatility, with feedback from aggregate growth gt to volatility  t governed by
the elasticity  .S e et h em a i nt e x tf o rf u r t h e rd e t a i l s .
3
3Model
Moment Data Benchmark Constant Feedback
equity premium E[RM   Rf] 5.43 2.43 0.22 2.43
Std[RM   Rf] 14.25 13.27 1.01 13.27
sharpe ratio E[RM   Rf]/Std[RM   Rf] 0.38 0.17 0.20 0.17
market return E[RM] 7.24 10.62 9.47 10.62
Std[RM] 14.44 14.41 1.01 14.41
risk free rate E[Rf] 1.81 8.19 9.25 8.19
Std[Rf] 1.20 5.55 0 5.57
price/dividend ratio E[p/y] (annual) 34.38 14.10 14.13 14.10
Std[log(p/y)] (annual) 38.63 20.56 0 20.56
Auto[log(p/y)] (monthly) 0.99 0.76 n/a 0.76
Table 3: Aggregate asset pricing implications of single   model.
Aggregate asset pricing moments in postwar US data. All return data is monthly 1959:1-2007:12 and reported in annualizedp e r c e n t . T h es t o c km a r k e ti n d e xi st h ev a l u e
weighted NYSE return from CRSP, and the risk-free return is the 90 day T-bill rate. We obtain real returns after deﬂating byt h eC P If r o mt h eB L S .D a t ao np r i c e / d i v i d e n d
ratios is annual 1959-2007. To annualize monthly returns we multiply by 12 and to annualize monthly standard deviations we multiply by
 
12. In Table 6 below, we compare
annualized monthly returns to returns calculated by explicitly time-aggregating from monthly to yearly. The Benchmarkm o d e lh a sas i n g l ec o m m o ns e g m e n t a t i o np a r a m e t e r
  and time-varying idiosyncratic endowment volatility  t.T h e C o n s t a n t   model sets  t =¯   i.e., to the Benchmark unconditional mean, for all t.T h e F e e d b a c km o d e l h a s
counter-cyclical endowment volatility, with feedback from aggregate growth gt to volatility  t governed by the elasticity  .S e et h em a i nt e x tf o rf u r t h e rd e t a i l s .
3
4Panel A: Segmentation parameters.
Parameter Moment
Portfolio std dev Market share
Market m  m  m Data Model Data Model
1 0.010 0.514 3.83 4.18 0.535 0.538
2 0.178 0.277 4.74 4.52 0.274 0.272
3 0.264 0.128 5.85 5.72 0.119 0.118
4 0.324 0.058 7.13 7.02 0.052 0.052
5 0.365 0.023 8.16 8.08 0.020 0.020
average 0.115
Panel B: Idiosyncratic endowment volatility.
Moment
Parameter Data Model
¯   0.816 average cross-section std dev returns 16.40 16.46
  v 0.198 time-series std dev cross-section std dev returns 4.17 4.18
  0.891 AR(1) cross-section std dev returns 0.84 0.85
Table 4: Market-speciﬁc segmentation: parameters and ﬁt.
The top panel shows the ﬁve segmentation parameters  m and measures of traders  m,f o rm =1 ,...5, and the portfolio standard deviation and market share moments in the
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)d a t at h e ya r ec h o s e nt om a t c h .T h eb o t t o mp a n e ls h o w st h ei d i osyncratic endowment volatility process parameters and them o m e n t si n
the Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003)c r o s s - s e c t i o n a ls t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no fs t o c kr e t u r n sd a t athey are chosen to match.
3
5Panel A: Market-speciﬁc asset pricing implications.
Risk premia





5  0.53 0.53
Panel B: Aggregate asset pricing implications.
Model
Moment Data  m ¯  
equity premium E[RM   Rf] 5.27 2.92 1.69
Std[RM   Rf] 14.25 15.54 11.11
sharpe ratio E[RM   Rf]/Std[RM   Rf] 0.38 0.17 0.14
market return E[RM] 7.24 11.07 10.27
Std[RM] 14.44 16.16 11.56
risk free rate E[Rf] 1.81 8.15 8.58
Std[Rf] 1.20 3.65 2.92
price/dividend ratio E[p/y] (annual) 34.38 13.90 14.04
Std[log(p/y)] (annual) 38.63 32.84 23.22
Auto[log(p/y)] (monthly) 0.99 0.88 0.88
Table 5: Asset pricing implications of market-speciﬁc segmentation.
The top panel shows the market risk premia implied by the ﬁve markets m =1 ,...5a n dt h e i rc o u n t e r p a r t si nt h eAng, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)d a t a .T h e s ea r er e p o r t e d
as monthly percent. The bottom panel shows the aggregate asset pricing implications. The column marked  m refers to the model with market-speciﬁc segmentation parameters
while the column marked ¯   refers to a model with a single segmentation parameter   that is set equal to the mean ¯   =
 
m  m m of the market-speciﬁc  m model.
3
6Annualized monthly Aggregated to yearly
average real risk-free rate 1.81 1.81
standard deviation of real risk free rate 1.20 2.43
average real NYSE return 7.24 7.27
standard deviation of real NYSE return 14.40 13.90
equity premium 5.43 5.47
standard deviation of equity premium 14.25 13.30
average price-dividend ratio 495.18 34.38
standard deviation of log price-dividend ratio 0.56 0.34
autocorrelation of log price-dividend ratio  0.02 0.89
average consumption growth 2.19 2.17
standard deviation of consumption growth 1.25 1.33
Table 6: Aggregate statistics in annualized monthly data and in monthly data time-aggregated to yearly.
Aggregate postwar US data. All return data is monthly 1959:1-2007:12 and reported in annualized percent. The stock market index is the value weighted NYSE return from
CRSP, and the risk-free return is the 90 day T-bill rate. Real consumption growth refers to the growth of real nondurables and services consumption per capita from the BEA.
The ﬁrst column shows annualized statistics for monthly data. To annualize monthly returns and consumption growth, we multiply by 12, and to annualize monthly standard
deviations, we multiply by
 
12. The second column shows statistics for yearly data, whicha r eo b t a i n e db yc o m p o u n d i n gr e t u r n sa n dg r o w t ho v e rt h er e l evant time interval.
The only statistics that are substantially di erent in this second column concern the price dividend ratio. This is because, in the ﬁrst column, the dividend that enters the ratio




Standard High No twist Standard High Standard High No twist
Calibrated parameters
  0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
¯   0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
  v 0.21 0.21 0.21 00 0.21 0.21 0.21
  0.78 0.78 0.79 n/a n/a 0.78 0.78 0.79
  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.51 2.51 2.52
Fitted moments
std dev diversiﬁed market portfolio return 4.16 4.16 4.16 1.01 1.01 4.16 4.16 4.16
average cross-section std dev returns 16.40 16.40 16.40 16.03 16.03 16.40 16.40 16.40
time-series std dev cross-section std dev returns 4.17 4.17 4.17 00 4.17 4.17 4.17
AR(1) cross-section std dev returns 0.84 0.84 0.84 n/a n/a 0.84 0.84 0.84
cross-section std dev returns on lagged growth n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.56  0.56  0.56
Asset pricing implications
E[RM   Rf] 2.43 2.43 2.43 0.22 0.22 2.43 2.43 2.42
Std[RM   Rf] 13.27 13.27 13.27 1.01 1.01 13.27 13.27 13.26
E[RM   Rf]/Std[RM   Rf] 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17
E[RM] 10.62 10.62 10.62 9.47 9.47 10.62 10.62 10.62
Std[RM] 14.41 14.41 14.41 1.01 1.01 14.41 14.41 14.41
E[Rf] 8.19 8.19 8.19 9.25 9.25 8.19 8.19 8.20
Std[Rf] 5.55 5.54 5.61 00 5.57 5.57 5.64
E[p/y] 14.10 14.10 14.10 14.13 14.13 14.10 14.10 14.10
Std[log(p/y)] 20.56 20.56 20.50 0020.57 20.57 20.50
Auto[log(p/y)] 0.76 0.76 0.76 n/a n/a 0.76 0.76 0.76
Table 7: Robustness of single   model solutions.
The standard precision case has N = Ng  N   Nˆ y =3 9 19 = 513 quadrature nodes and weights. The high precision case has N = Ng  N   Nˆ y =5 19 25 = 2,375. In
both these cases, the “twisted” density recommended by Flod` en (2008)i su s e dt oa l l e v i a t ec o n c e r n sa b o u tt h ea c c u r a c yo ft h eTauchen and Hussey (1991)p r o c e d u r ew h e nt h e
stochastic process is persistent (see equation (30)i nAppendix B). The ﬁnal no twist case uses the plain Tauchen and Hussey procedure and same conﬁguration of nodes as in
the standard case. The issue of twisting does not arise in the constant   model.
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